הפרדה מגדרית במרחב הציבורי: מיפוי תיאורי ומודל נורמטיבי ראשוני

Gender separation in the Israeli public sphere is subject to deep empirical and normative controversy: its proponents argue that gender separation is voluntary, generally equal, and limited to the ultra-Orthodox society, thus there is no normative justification for limiting it. Opponents of gender separation oppose both the empirical description of gender separation and the normative conclusions that are drawn on the basis thereof. Instead, they argue that the separation is generally involuntary and unequal, and that it extends beyond ultra-Orthodox spheres to impact the general public. Despite the importance of this debate, there is currently no comprehensive description of the phenomenon or a clear normative model that allows fora consistent resolution of the complex questions it raises. This Article tackles this dual omission by proposing a descriptive account of gender separation in the Israeli public sphere and a preliminary normative model for analyzing claims associated with it. The descriptive account is based on an original database that encompasses 446 unique cases of gender separation documented in the media and the case law over 20 years (2001–2020). The findings indicate that gender separation is implemented over a wide range of public resources and services, is not limited to the ultra-Orthodox or religious sectors, and in many cases is unequal and involuntary. At the same time, gender separation also has private, egalitarian and voluntary manifestations that should not be neglected in the analysis.With a comprehensive description of gender separation in place, the paper develops a preliminary normative model for analyzing claims for gender separation in the public space. The model analyzes the issue using three main axes: (a) the public/private nature of the separation; (b) the equal/unequal nature of the separation; (c) the voluntariness of the separation. This three-dimensional system first helps to separate simple from difficult cases, and secondly helps to define the gaps that must bead dressed in order to decide the difficult cases. I argue that the simple cases – in which gender separation is clearly permissible or clearly prohibited – are found at the extreme of the axes. Thus, when an instance of gender separation is public, discriminatory and coercive, it must be prohibited; and when it is clearly private, egalitarian and voluntary, it can be allowed. In contrast, the difficult cases are near the origins of the axes,e.g. where the separation is neither clearly coercive nor clearly voluntary. Is how that much of the difficulty in deciding the difficult cases stems from a lack of sufficient empirical evidence. A complete normative model of the issue can only be developed once we have a more comprehensive empirical understanding of the characteristics and implications of gender separation. For now, the preliminary model provides a concise and empirically-based roadmap for addressing various forms of gender separation in a uniform and consistent manner.