הקבלה בפסיקת החפץ חיים

Among halakhic authorities of the past we can find a large spectrum of opinions regarding the status of the Kabbalah as a source of law. On the one hand there were those who adopted a doctrine of separation, viewing the Kabbalah as no more than a recommended norm, while on the other, we find proponents of integration, who viewed the Kabbalah as a fully-fledged source of Halakhah, at least to the degree that it did not contradict the Talmud and other legal authorities (Poskim). This article constructs a general model for the evaluation of the status of the Kabbalah in the works of later halakhic authorities and applies it to R. Israel Meir HaCohen (or Kagan), known as the Hafetz Hayim (?1839—1933). The model, which combines a quantitative and qualitative approach, is in four stages: (1) the author's declaration of principles; (2) a systematic collection of his rulings referring to the Kabbalah, obtained through the use of computer databases; (3) analyses of the rulings according to the following criteria: (a) what are the kabbalistic sources to which the author refers?; (b) does he address them directly or via intermediaries, and, if so, which ones?; (c) does he turn to the Kabbalah only for stringent rulings or for lenient ones as well?; (4) drawing conclusions and viewing them in a broader perspective: Juxtaposing the findings of the previous stages and placing them within the author's historical context and world-view. The application of this model to the Hafetz Hayim leads to the following conclusions: In principle, the Hafetz Hayim had a deep reverence towards the Kabbalah as theology, but he did not deal with it very much, and in the sphere of Halakhah he was quite close to the 'doctrine of separation'. He referred to kabbalistic sources more than 160 times, usually citing the Zohar and the writings of R. Isaac Luria, the Ari. However, only four of these sources were referred to directly, without an intermediary; all the rest were cited via the Magen Avraham, Ba'er Heitev, Sha'arei Teshuva and other Halakhic authorities. Only six rulings adopted from the Kabbalah were lenient, and even those were only to a slight degree. Often his reference to the Kabbalah is actually aimed at preserving or strengthening already-existing customs based on their norms. And even then, his reliance on kabbalistic sources is less extensive than that of most of his predecessors. The obvious conclusion is that the Hafetz Hayim did not engage in active study of the Kabbalah, and his rulings mark the end of the stage of 'direct absorption' of kabbalistic sources into Halakhah. What had already been absorbed via previous authorities or via popular customs could be accepted, but no further references to the Jewish mystical literature were to be made. This approach was in accordance with the Hafetz Hayim's views on faith: he opposed all theological inquiry, whether philosophical or kabbalistic, and favoured 'simple faith' and popular beliefs. His approach was one of the signs of the decline of the Kabbalah in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both in faith and law.