נטל ההוכחה והזכות לקיום בכבוד: תרומתו האפשרית של המשפט העברי

The right to live in dignity has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Israel as a constitutional right, entitling every Israeli to the satisfaction of vital needs. Typically, discussions surrounding this right focus on its content, addressing questions such as the standard of living the state must ensure for a person to live with dignity, the individuals protected by the right, and whether the protection can be conditioned on certain actions by those living in poverty. In contrast, this article delves into a procedural aspect related to the right to live in dignity: how to prove a violation of this right. Specifically, it explores the question of who bears the burden of proving a violation or non-violation of the right to live in dignity. The Justices of the Supreme Court of Israel wrestled with this question, diverging in their perspectives on the appropriate answer. Their debate touches on fundamental issues within the realm of socio-economic rights and has practical implications for the efficacy of judicial review in this field. The article analyzes the original rule developed by Jewish law in this context and examines its potential to offer a new perspective to the legal discourse on this question.