A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

Nir Dagan*, Oscar Volij, Eyal Winter

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)811-823
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume19
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2002

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