Abstract
In recent years the controversy over Drive versus Relational models of the psyche has become entangled in a philosophical controversy over epistemology. Some have argued that the Drive model was a relic of an age of positivistic science, while Relational models are a product of a postmodern condition. This paper argues that the controversy need not be a philosophical one, and that Relational views are not, in fact, a product of postmodernism, nor are they necessarily dependent on a postmodern epistemology. Separating the epistemological from the psychological more carefully may help return the debate to its proper, psychoanalytic domain, and perhaps contribute to a more fruitful dialogue across what, at times, seems like an abyss between Relational views and Drive theory.
Original language | American English |
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Pages (from-to) | 507-527 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | International Journal of Psychoanalysis |
Volume | 90 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2009 |
Keywords
- Drive theory
- Positivism
- Postmodernism
- Pragmatism
- Relational psychoanalysis
- Relational theory
- Relativism
- Stephen mitchell
- Truth