Abstract
Academic institutions seek to enhance their reputation, which is one of their primary assets. Doing so requires a massive investment of resources in research, recruiting a high-quality academic staff, and building campuses and state-of-the-art laboratories. To obtain the necessary financial resources, institutions must attract students, donors, and government budgets and grants. This paper introduces a stylized dynamic model demonstrating how an institution can best allocate its resources between teaching and research. We create a simulated competition that resembles the real situation where the enhancement of the institution’s reputation depends not only on its resource allocation but also on its competitors’ actions and reputation. We consider a two-institution contest over time using a differential game solution with open-loop strategies. In this case, the steady-state investment in research increases and the level of teaching decreases.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 101129 |
| Pages (from-to) | 67-85 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Annals of Operations Research |
| Volume | 343 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2024.
Keywords
- Differential game
- Education
- Optimal control
- Resource allocation
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