A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma

Motty Perry*, Philip J. Reny

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

In general terms, Solomon's dilemma is this. There are many agents. An object must be awarded at no cost to the one agent who values it most. We provide a mechanism that implements this outcome in iteratively weakly undominated strategies when it is common knowledge that the agent who most values the object knows who he is.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C60, C72, D61, D74, D82.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)279-285
Number of pages7
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume26
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1999

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