A modular approach to Roberts' theorem

Shahar Dobzinski; Noam Nisan

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_3

A modular approach to Roberts' theorem

Shahar Dobzinski^*, Noam Nisan

^*Corresponding author for this work

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

Roberts' theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts' proof is somewhat "magical" and we provide a new "modular" proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings
Pages	14-23
Number of pages	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_3
State	Published - 2009
Event	2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009 - Paphos, Cyprus Duration: 18 Oct 2009 → 20 Oct 2009

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	5814 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009
Country/Territory	Cyprus
City	Paphos
Period	18/10/09 → 20/10/09

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Supported by the Adams Fellowship Program of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and by a grant from the Israel Academy of Sciences.

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_3

Cite this

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author = "Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan",

note = "Funding Information: Supported by the Adams Fellowship Program of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and by a grant from the Israel Academy of Sciences.; 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009 ; Conference date: 18-10-2009 Through 20-10-2009",

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Dobzinski, S & Nisan, N 2009, A modular approach to Roberts' theorem. in Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5814 LNCS, pp. 14-23, 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009, Paphos, Cyprus, 18/10/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_3

A modular approach to Roberts' theorem. / Dobzinski, Shahar; Nisan, Noam.
Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings. 2009. p. 14-23 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5814 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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A modular approach to Roberts' theorem

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