A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

Dieter Balkenborg; Eyal Winter

doi:10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

Dieter Balkenborg^*, Eyal Winter

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	325-345
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	27
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8
State	Published - Apr 1997

Keywords

Backward induction
Common knowledge
Extensive games
Subgame perfection

Access to Document

10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

Cite this

@article{ecc0481defb7493bb759d11879adb4d2,

title = "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction",

abstract = "In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.",

keywords = "Backward induction, Common knowledge, Extensive games, Subgame perfection",

author = "Dieter Balkenborg and Eyal Winter",

year = "1997",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "27",

pages = "325--345",

journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",

issn = "0304-4068",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

AU - Balkenborg, Dieter

AU - Winter, Eyal

PY - 1997/4

Y1 - 1997/4

N2 - In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.

AB - In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.

KW - Backward induction

KW - Common knowledge

KW - Extensive games

KW - Subgame perfection

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0031115828&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

DO - 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:0031115828

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 27

SP - 325

EP - 345

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

IS - 3

ER -

A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this