A Neo2 bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games

Sergiu Hart*, Salvatore Modica, David Schmeidler

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows and n columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonie and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the corresponding m × n utility matrix (viewed as a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)347-358
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume23
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1994

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