Abstract
We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from settings in which agents need to jointly choose one of several alternatives, and may use transfers to redistribute the welfare generated by the chosen alternative. One such setting is the Shared–Rental problem, in which students jointly rent an apartment and need to decide which bedroom to allocate to each student, depending on the student’s preferences. Many solution concepts have been proposed for such settings, ranging from mechanisms without transfers, such as Random Priority and the Eating mechanism, to mechanisms with transfers, such as envy free solutions, the Shapley value, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We seek a solution concept that satisfies three natural properties, concerning efficiency, fairness and decomposition. We observe that every solution concept known (to us) fails to satisfy at least one of the three properties. We present a new solution concept, designed so as to satisfy the three properties. A certain submodularity condition (which holds in interesting special cases such as the Shared-Rental setting) implies both existence and uniqueness of our solution concept.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, WINE 2019, Proceedings |
Editors | Ioannis Caragiannis, Vahab Mirrokni, Evdokia Nikolova |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 71-84 |
Number of pages | 14 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030353889 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 15th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2019 - New York City, United States Duration: 10 Dec 2019 → 12 Dec 2019 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 11920 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 15th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2019 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | New York City |
Period | 10/12/19 → 12/12/19 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Keywords
- Anticore
- Envy-free
- Fairness
- Shared-Rental