Abstract
We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 5098952 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-28 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | Theory and Decision |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2002 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We would like to thank Koichi Tadenuma and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Akira Okada gratefully acknowledges the financial supports from the Ministry of Education and Science of Japan under Grant-in-Aid Program for Scientific Research (C) No. 07630012 and from Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance. Eyal Winter is grateful to the German-Israeli Foundation for its financial support and to the European Commission for their support through a TMR research grant.
Keywords
- Core
- Game equilibrium
- Multilateral bargaining
- Non-cooperative axiomatization