TY - JOUR
T1 - A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers
AU - Perry, Motty
AU - Reny, Philip J.
PY - 1993/2
Y1 - 1993/2
N2 - Rubinstein′s alternating-offers bargaining model is enriched by allowing players to choose when and whether or not to make an offer. Time is continuous and players make offers whenever they wish. It is assumed that upon making an offer, players must wait a fixed amount of time before making another. It is shown that if players can react arbitrarily quickly to their opponent′s offers, then all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are Rubinstein-like, in particular, efficient. However, if it takes time to react, then some delay can be supported. This potential delay becomes arbitrarily large as reaction times increase. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: C78, C72.
AB - Rubinstein′s alternating-offers bargaining model is enriched by allowing players to choose when and whether or not to make an offer. Time is continuous and players make offers whenever they wish. It is assumed that upon making an offer, players must wait a fixed amount of time before making another. It is shown that if players can react arbitrarily quickly to their opponent′s offers, then all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are Rubinstein-like, in particular, efficient. However, if it takes time to react, then some delay can be supported. This potential delay becomes arbitrarily large as reaction times increase. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: C78, C72.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0002912577&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1993.1004
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1993.1004
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AN - SCOPUS:0002912577
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 59
SP - 50
EP - 77
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -