A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential

Sergiu Hart; Andreu Mas-Colell

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_7

A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential

Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

One of the most successful cooperative solution concepts in game theory is that of value. Originally defined for n-person games with transferable utility (``TU'') by Shapley [1953b], it has been extended to general games with nontransferable utility (``NTU'') by Harsanyi [1959, 1963] and Shapley [1969] and applied to numerous models. These applications, in turn, have always yielded important insights (to mention just one: the ``value equivalence principle'' in purely competitive economies).

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi
Editors	Reinhard Selten
Place of Publication	Berlin, Heidelberg
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages	83-93
Number of pages	11
ISBN (Print)	978-3-662-09664-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_7
State	Published - 1992

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_7

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abstract = "One of the most successful cooperative solution concepts in game theory is that of value. Originally defined for n-person games with transferable utility (``TU'') by Shapley [1953b], it has been extended to general games with nontransferable utility (``NTU'') by Harsanyi [1959, 1963] and Shapley [1969] and applied to numerous models. These applications, in turn, have always yielded important insights (to mention just one: the ``value equivalence principle'' in purely competitive economies).",

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A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential

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