TY - JOUR
T1 - A note on vigilance behavior and stability against recognizable social parasites
AU - Motro, Uzi
AU - Cohen, Dan
PY - 1989/1/9
Y1 - 1989/1/9
N2 - Vigilance for predators while feeding seems to present an evolutionary problem: whereas vigilance confers a common benefit to all the group members, its cost is borne only by the vigilant individual itself. Pulliam et al. (1982, J. theor. Biol. 95, 89) and Parker & Hammerstein (1985, Game theory and animal behaviour: In: Evolution: Essays in honour of John Maynard Smith, pp. 73-94.) demonstrated that in cases of diminishing returns with regard to feeding time, an evolutionarily stable vigilance strategy, represented by a positive probability of being vigilant at each time unit, can exist. Thus, if this strategy is the prevailing one in the population, any individual which defects from vigilance duty suffers a reduction in fitness. But what happens if the non-vigilant defector can be recognized as such by the other group members? This work attempts to answer this question and to shed some more light on the evolutionary stability in the vigilance game.
AB - Vigilance for predators while feeding seems to present an evolutionary problem: whereas vigilance confers a common benefit to all the group members, its cost is borne only by the vigilant individual itself. Pulliam et al. (1982, J. theor. Biol. 95, 89) and Parker & Hammerstein (1985, Game theory and animal behaviour: In: Evolution: Essays in honour of John Maynard Smith, pp. 73-94.) demonstrated that in cases of diminishing returns with regard to feeding time, an evolutionarily stable vigilance strategy, represented by a positive probability of being vigilant at each time unit, can exist. Thus, if this strategy is the prevailing one in the population, any individual which defects from vigilance duty suffers a reduction in fitness. But what happens if the non-vigilant defector can be recognized as such by the other group members? This work attempts to answer this question and to shed some more light on the evolutionary stability in the vigilance game.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33645965394&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80186-9
DO - 10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80186-9
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:33645965394
SN - 0022-5193
VL - 136
SP - 21
EP - 25
JO - Journal of Theoretical Biology
JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology
IS - 1
ER -