A puzzle about experts, evidential screening-off and conditionalization

Ittay Nissan-Rozen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


I present a puzzle about the epistemic role beliefs about experts' beliefs play in a rational agent's system of beliefs. It is shown that accepting the claim that an expert's degree of belief in a proposition, A, screens off the evidential support another proposition, B, gives to A in case the expert knows and is certain about whether B is true, leads in some cases to highly unintuitive conclusions. I suggest a solution to the puzzle according to which evidential screening off is rejected, but show that the price of this solution is either giving up on the mere idea of deferring to expert's opinion or giving up on Bayesian conditionalization.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)64-72
Number of pages9
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Cambridge University Press.


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