A quantitative version of the gibbard-satterthwaite theorem for three alternatives

Ehud Friedgut; Gil Kalai; Nathan Keller; Noam Nisan

doi:10.1137/090756740

A quantitative version of the gibbard-satterthwaite theorem for three alternatives

Ehud Friedgut^*, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisan

^*Corresponding author for this work

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every nondictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with a nonnegligible probability for any election rule among three alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship and from having only two alternatives in its range.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	934-952
Number of pages	19
Journal	SIAM Journal on Computing
Volume	40
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1137/090756740
State	Published - 2011

Keywords

Algorithmic game theory
Arrow theorem
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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10.1137/090756740

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A quantitative version of the gibbard-satterthwaite theorem for three alternatives

Abstract

Keywords

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