TY - JOUR
T1 - A sealed-bid auction that matches the english auction
AU - Perry, Motty
AU - Wolfstetter, Elmar
AU - Zamir, Shmuel
PY - 2000/11
Y1 - 2000/11
N2 - This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.
AB - This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.
KW - Auctions
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0005121672&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/game.1999.0780
DO - 10.1006/game.1999.0780
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AN - SCOPUS:0005121672
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 33
SP - 265
EP - 273
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -