A sealed-bid auction that matches the english auction

Motty Perry; Elmar Wolfstetter; Shmuel Zamir

doi:10.1006/game.1999.0780

A sealed-bid auction that matches the english auction

Motty Perry^*
, Elmar Wolfstetter
, Shmuel Zamir

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	265-273
Number of pages	9
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	33
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0780
State	Published - Nov 2000

Keywords

Auctions

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10.1006/game.1999.0780

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title = "A sealed-bid auction that matches the english auction",

abstract = "This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.",

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AB - This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.

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A sealed-bid auction that matches the english auction

Abstract

Keywords

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