A triviality result for the “Desire by Necessity” thesis

Ittay Nissan-Rozen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


A triviality result for what Lewis (Mind 105: 303–313, 1996) called “the Desire by Necessity Thesis” and Broome (Mind 100(2): 265–267, 1991) called “the Desire as Expectation Thesis” is presented. The result shows that this thesis and three other reasonable conditions can be jointly satisfied only in trivial cases. Some meta-ethical implications of the result are discussed. The discussion also highlights several issues regarding Lewis’ original triviality result for “the Desire as Belief Thesis” that have not been properly understood in the literature.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)2535-2556
Number of pages22
Issue number8
StatePublished - 30 Aug 2015

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© 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.


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