A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

E. Winter

doi:10.1007/BF01268161

A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

E. Winter^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

76 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	227-240
Number of pages	14
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	18
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01268161
State	Published - Jun 1989

Keywords

Coalitions
Cooperations
Shapley value

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10.1007/BF01268161

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A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

Abstract

Keywords

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