A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

E. Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

73 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)227-240
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume18
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1989

Keywords

  • Coalitions
  • Cooperations
  • Shapley value

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this