Abstract
This chapter reviews Rawls' attempt to address the theoretical problem of extending the principles of justice to future generations. It examines the two options suggested by Rawls for solving the problem: the 'general assembly' and 'the present-time-of-entry'. It argues that Rawls does not directly address the problem of the identity of future (possible) people, which means that the conditions for the inclusion of future people in the original position cannot be fully determined. Rawls wishes to offer a theory of just intergenerational distributions but it turns out that such a theory is logically dependent on the number and identity of future people, an issue which cannot itself be fixed in terms of an ideal contract under a veil of ignorance. The conclusion of the article is that the scope of the group in which the principles of justice are decided and implemented cannot itself be determined by a contractarian method.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Intergenerational Justice |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191712319 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199282951 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Sep 2009 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The several contributors 2009. All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Circumstances of justice
- Future generations
- Identity
- Impartiality
- Original position
- Rawls
- Saving
- Solidarity