Acceptable points in games of perfect information

Robert J. Aumann*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

56 Scopus citations

Abstract

This is the second of a series of papers on the theory of acceptable points in n-person games. The first was [1]; in it the notion of acceptable points was defined for cooperative games, and a fundamental theorem was proved relating the acceptable expected payoffs for a single play of a game to probable average payoffs for ”strong equilibrium points“ in its supergame.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)381-417
Number of pages37
JournalPacific Journal of Mathematics
Volume10
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1960

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