Advances in Auctions

Todd R. Kaplan; Shmuel Zamir

doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00007-0

Advances in Auctions

Todd R. Kaplan, Shmuel Zamir

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the previous Handbook chapter on this topic.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Publisher	Elsevier B.V.
Pages	381-453
Number of pages	73
Edition	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00007-0
State	Published - 2015

Publication series

Name	Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Number	1
Volume	4
ISSN (Print)	1574-0005

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Auctions
Dynamic auctions
Monotone equilibrium
Multiunit auctions
Position auctions
Private-value auctions
Resale
Spectrum auctions

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10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00007-0

Cite this

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KW - Dynamic auctions

KW - Monotone equilibrium

KW - Multiunit auctions

KW - Position auctions

KW - Private-value auctions

KW - Resale

KW - Spectrum auctions

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Advances in Auctions

Abstract

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Bibliographical note

Keywords

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