Abstract
According to 'strong cognitivism', all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down one that proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of caring and derives a conclusion regarding the (motivational and normative) nature of more basic mental phenomena - particular desires.
Original language | American English |
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Pages (from-to) | 139-158 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review |
Volume | 54 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 27 May 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2014.