Abstract
We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents' interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools do not suffice.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 166-196 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue number | 1-2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2001 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:∗This research was supported by grants from the Israeli ministry of Science and the Israeli academy of sciences. †E-mail: [email protected]. ‡To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: [email protected].