## Abstract

In a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the two-person bargaining problem. In this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum. If the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways (for example, because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit), any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small. We also show that, for a fixed discount rate, all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the discrete game converge to the solution obtained by Rubinstein if the smallest money unit tends to zero.

Original language | American English |
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Pages (from-to) | 188-201 |

Number of pages | 14 |

Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |

Volume | 2 |

Issue number | 2 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Jun 1990 |