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An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions

  • Edo Zurel*
  • , Noam Nisan
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

103 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a heuristic for allocation in combinatorial auctions. We first run an approximation algorithm on the linear programming relaxation of the combinatorial auction. We then run a sequence of greedy algorithms, starting with the order on the bids determined by the approximate linear program and continuing in a hill-climbing fashion using local improvements in the order of bids. We have implemented the algorithm and have tested it on the complete corpus of instances provided by Vohra and de Vries as well as on instances drawn from the distributions of Leyton-Brown, Pearson, and Shoham. Our algorithm typically runs two to three orders of magnitude faster than the reported running times of Vohra and de Vries, while achieving an average approximation error of less than 1%. This algorithm can provide, in less than a minute of CPU time, excellent solutions for problems with over 1000 items and 10,000 bids. We thus believe that combinatorial auctions for most purposes face no practical computational hurdles.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC'01
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages125-136
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9781581133875
DOIs
StatePublished - 14 Oct 2001
Event3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2001 - Tampa, FL, United States
Duration: 14 Oct 200117 Oct 2001

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2001
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityTampa, FL
Period14/10/0117/10/01

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