Abstract
An auction that consists of a collection of second-price auctions between each pair of bidders conducted over at most two rounds of bidding is presented. The auction contains two main features. The first is the presence of two rounds of bidding. The second is the use of a collection of two-bidder single-unit second-price auctions to achieve efficiency in a many-bidder multi-unit setting. The success of this auction approach rests on designing the payments so that it is in fact rational for bidders to behave as if they are bidding in many separate single-unit second-price auctions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1199-1212 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Econometrica |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2002 |