An efficient multi-unit ascending auction

Motty Perry; Philip J. Reny

doi:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00343.x

An efficient multi-unit ascending auction

Motty Perry^*, Philip J. Reny

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

39 Scopus citations

Abstract

We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel's (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny's (2002) generalization of Vickrey's (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction. Bidders are permitted both to express different demands against different bidders, as well as to increase their demands. The equilibrium strategies are closely related to the familiar "drop out when price equals value" strategy of the English auction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	567-592
Number of pages	26
Journal	Review of Economic Studies
Volume	72
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00343.x
State	Published - Apr 2005

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An efficient multi-unit ascending auction

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