Abstract
We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter, for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. This is repeated for the case where customers are heterogeneous. The mechanisms are based on the fact that once some customers get priority, its value of the other gets even higher.
Original language | American English |
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Pages (from-to) | 304-308 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | Operations Research Letters |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2020 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The first author was partially supported by the Israel Research Fund , Grant no. 511/15 and no. 1512/19 .
Funding Information:
The first author was partially supported by the Israel Research Fund, Grant no. 511/15 and no. 1512/19.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.
Keywords
- Charging mechanisms
- Priorities
- Queues