APPROXIMATE PURIFICATION OF MIXED STRATEGIES.

R. J. Aumann*, Y. Katznelson, R. Radner, R. W. Rosenthal, B. Weiss

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

Under relatively weak conditions on the information structure of a game it is shown that any mixed strategy of a player can be replaced by a certain pure strategy without affecting any player's expected payoff appreciably, no matter what strategies the other players use. Under even weaker conditions the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is shown to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy combination which is an approximate equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)327-341
Number of pages15
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume8
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1983

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