Approximating nash equilibria in tree polymatrix games

Siddharth Barman*, Katrina Ligett, Georgios Piliouras

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of tree polymatrix games in which the number of actions per player is a fixed constant. Further, for trees with constant degree, the running time of the algorithm matches the best known upper bound for approximating Nash equilibria in bimatrix games (Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta 2003). Notably, this work closely complements the hardness result of Rubinstein (2015), which establishes the inapproximability of Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over constant-degree bipartite graphs with two actions per player.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015
EditorsMartin Hoefer, Martin Hoefer
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages285-296
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9783662484326
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015 - Saarbrucken, Germany
Duration: 28 Sep 201530 Sep 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9347
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015
Country/TerritoryGermany
CitySaarbrucken
Period28/09/1530/09/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Approximating nash equilibria in tree polymatrix games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this