Abstract
In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn’s critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as ‘cognitive’. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representationalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and alternative avenues for cognitive research are suggested.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 235-255 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
Volume | 5 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 1992 |