Are connectionist models cognitive?

Benny Shanon*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn’s critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as ‘cognitive’. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representationalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and alternative avenues for cognitive research are suggested.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)235-255
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume5
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1992

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