Are We There Yet? On RPKI’s Deployment and Security

Yossi Gilad*, Avichai Cohen, Amir Herzberg, Michael Schapira, Haya Shulman

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

52 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) binds IP address blocks to owners’ public keys. RPKI enables routers to perform Route Origin Validation (ROV), thus preventing devastating attacks such as IP prefix hijacking. Yet, despite extensive effort, RPKI’s deployment is frustratingly sluggish, leaving the Internet largely insecure. We tackle fundamental questions regarding today’s RPKI’s deployment and security: What is the adoption status of RPKI and ROV? What are the implications for global security of partial adoption? What are the root-causes for slow adoption? How can deployment be pushed forward? We address these questions through a combination of empirical analyses, a survey of over 100 network practitioners, and extensive simulations. Our main contributions include the following. We present the first study measuring ROV enforcement, revealing disappointingly low adoption at the core of the Internet. We show, in contrast, that without almost ubiquitous ROV adoption by large ISPs significant security benefits cannot be attained. We next expose a critical security vulnerability: about a third of RPKI authorizations issued for IP prefixes do not protect the prefix from hijacking attacks. We examine potential reasons for scarce adoption of RPKI and ROV, including human error in issuing RPKI certificates and inter-organization dependencies, and present recommendations for addressing these challenges.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publication24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017
PublisherThe Internet Society
ISBN (Electronic)1891562460, 9781891562464
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017
Event24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017 - San Diego, United States
Duration: 26 Feb 20171 Mar 2017

Publication series

Name24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017

Conference

Conference24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period26/02/171/03/17

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017. All Rights Reserved.

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