Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules

Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Assaf Romm*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

School districts that implement stable matchings face various decisions that affect students' assignments to schools. We study the properties of the rank distribution of students with random preferences when schools use different tie-breaking rules to rank equivalent students. Under a single tie-breaking rule, where all schools use the same ranking, a constant fraction of students are assigned to one of their top choices. In contrast, under a multiple tie-breaking rule, where each school independently ranks students, a vanishing fraction of students are matched with one of their top choices. However, if students are allowed to submit only relatively short preference lists under a multiple tie-breaking rule, a constant fraction of students will be matched with one of their top choices, while only a “small” fraction of students will remain unmatched.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)167-187
Number of pages21
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume115
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

  • Deferred acceptance
  • School choice
  • Stable matching
  • Tie-breaking rule

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this