TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions
T2 - Analytic solutions to the general case
AU - Kaplan, Todd R.
AU - Zamir, Shmuel
PY - 2012/6
Y1 - 2012/6
N2 - In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on [v{script} 2, v{script} 2] and [v{script} 2, v{script} 2]. To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.
AB - In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on [v{script} 2, v{script} 2] and [v{script} 2, v{script} 2]. To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.
KW - Asymmetric auctions
KW - First-price auctions
KW - Incomplete information
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84861344334&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00199-010-0563-9
DO - 10.1007/s00199-010-0563-9
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AN - SCOPUS:84861344334
SN - 0938-2259
VL - 50
SP - 269
EP - 302
JO - Economic Theory
JF - Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -