Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: Analytic solutions to the general case

Todd R. Kaplan, Shmuel Zamir

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

65 Scopus citations

Abstract

In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on [v{script} 2, v{script} 2] and [v{script} 2, v{script} 2]. To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)269-302
Number of pages34
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume50
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2012

Keywords

  • Asymmetric auctions
  • First-price auctions
  • Incomplete information

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