| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon |
| Editors | Karolina Hübner, Justin Steinberg |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Pages | 36-40 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781108834223 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2024 |
Abstract
Spinoza defines attributes (attributum) thus: “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (E1def4). We can begin by noting two elements of the definition that make apparent the centrality of attributes to Spinoza’s metaphysics: first, attributes are closely associated with the very essence of substance. Second, attributes are intimately related to the way in which the intellect perceives the essence of substance. In spite of their centrality in Spinoza’s philosophy, there is astonishingly little agreement among scholars as to their nature.