Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

Moshe Haviv*, Igal Milchtaich

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine and compare the (normally, mixed) symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price and all-pay common value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same budget.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-146
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume114
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2012

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Identical bidders
  • Random-player games
  • Stochastic number of bidders
  • Symmetric equilibrium

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