Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

Moshe Haviv; Igal Milchtaich

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.016

Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

Moshe Haviv^*
, Igal Milchtaich

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Statistics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine and compare the (normally, mixed) symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price and all-pay common value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same budget.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	143-146
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	114
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.016
State	Published - Feb 2012

Keywords

Auctions
Identical bidders
Random-player games
Stochastic number of bidders
Symmetric equilibrium

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.016

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title = "Auctions with a random number of identical bidders",

abstract = "We examine and compare the (normally, mixed) symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price and all-pay common value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same budget.",

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KW - Auctions

KW - Identical bidders

KW - Random-player games

KW - Stochastic number of bidders

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Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

Abstract

Keywords

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