We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g. that discrete prices are informationally efficient, as well as some surprising properties, e.g. that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones.
|Original language||American English|
|Number of pages||10|
|Journal||Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings|
|State||Published - 2002|
|Event||The 34rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Vancouver, BC, Canada|
Duration: 16 Nov 2002 → 19 Nov 2002