Auctions with severely bounded communication

Liad Blumrosen*, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

31 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g. that discrete prices are informationally efficient, as well as some surprising properties, e.g. that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)406-415
Number of pages10
JournalAnnual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings
StatePublished - 2002
EventThe 34rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: 16 Nov 200219 Nov 2002

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