TY - JOUR
T1 - Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games
AU - Hart, Sergiu
AU - Mas-Colell, Andreu
PY - 2010/3
Y1 - 2010/3
N2 - In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to "threats." We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies, the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.
AB - In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to "threats." We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies, the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=76349093159&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1162/jeea.2010.8.1.7
DO - 10.1162/jeea.2010.8.1.7
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AN - SCOPUS:76349093159
SN - 1542-4766
VL - 8
SP - 7
EP - 33
JO - Journal of the European Economic Association
JF - Journal of the European Economic Association
IS - 1
ER -