Bargaining and value

Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

200 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility (NTU) case. Moreover, we show that any variation (in a certain class) of our bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the TU setup must yield the consistent value in the general NTU setup.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)357-380
Number of pages24
JournalEconometrica
Volume64
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1996

Keywords

  • Coalitional games
  • Consistent value
  • n-person bargaining
  • Noncooperative implementation
  • NTU-value
  • Shapley value

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