Bargaining over the interference channel

Amir Leshem*, Ephraim Zehavi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

42 Scopus citations


In this paper we analyze the interference channel as a conflict situation. This viewpoint implies that certain points in the rate region are unreasonable to one of the players. Therefore these points cannot be considered achievable based on game theoretic considerations. We then propose to use Nash bargaining solution as a tool that provides preferred points on the boundary of the game theoretic rate region. We provide analysis for the 2×2 intereference channel using the FDM achievable rate region. We also outline how to generalize our results to other achievable rate regions for the interference channel as well as the multiple access channel.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006
Number of pages5
StatePublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes
Event2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006 - Seattle, WA, United States
Duration: 9 Jul 200614 Jul 2006

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
ISSN (Print)2157-8101


Conference2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySeattle, WA


  • Distributed coordination
  • Game theory
  • Interference channel
  • Multiple access channel
  • Spectrum optimization


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