Bargaining over the interference channel

Amir Leshem; Ephraim Zehavi

doi:10.1109/ISIT.2006.261946

Bargaining over the interference channel

Amir Leshem^*, Ephraim Zehavi

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

42 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the interference channel as a conflict situation. This viewpoint implies that certain points in the rate region are unreasonable to one of the players. Therefore these points cannot be considered achievable based on game theoretic considerations. We then propose to use Nash bargaining solution as a tool that provides preferred points on the boundary of the game theoretic rate region. We provide analysis for the 2×2 intereference channel using the FDM achievable rate region. We also outline how to generalize our results to other achievable rate regions for the interference channel as well as the multiple access channel.

Original language	American English
Title of host publication	Proceedings - 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006
Pages	2225-2229
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2006.261946
State	Published - 2006
Externally published	Yes
Event	2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006 - Seattle, WA, United States Duration: 9 Jul 2006 → 14 Jul 2006

Publication series

Name	IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
ISSN (Print)	2157-8101

Conference

Conference	2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006
Country/Territory	United States
City	Seattle, WA
Period	9/07/06 → 14/07/06

Keywords

Distributed coordination
Game theory
Interference channel
Multiple access channel
Spectrum optimization

Access to Document

10.1109/ISIT.2006.261946

Cite this

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title = "Bargaining over the interference channel",

abstract = "In this paper we analyze the interference channel as a conflict situation. This viewpoint implies that certain points in the rate region are unreasonable to one of the players. Therefore these points cannot be considered achievable based on game theoretic considerations. We then propose to use Nash bargaining solution as a tool that provides preferred points on the boundary of the game theoretic rate region. We provide analysis for the 2×2 intereference channel using the FDM achievable rate region. We also outline how to generalize our results to other achievable rate regions for the interference channel as well as the multiple access channel.",

keywords = "Distributed coordination, Game theory, Interference channel, Multiple access channel, Spectrum optimization",

author = "Amir Leshem and Ephraim Zehavi",

year = "2006",

doi = "10.1109/ISIT.2006.261946",

language = "American English",

isbn = "1424405041",

series = "IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings",

pages = "2225--2229",

booktitle = "Proceedings - 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006",

note = "2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006 ; Conference date: 09-07-2006 Through 14-07-2006",

}

Leshem, A & Zehavi, E 2006, Bargaining over the interference channel. in Proceedings - 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006., 4036365, IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings, pp. 2225-2229, 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006, Seattle, WA, United States, 9/07/06. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2006.261946

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AU - Zehavi, Ephraim

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N2 - In this paper we analyze the interference channel as a conflict situation. This viewpoint implies that certain points in the rate region are unreasonable to one of the players. Therefore these points cannot be considered achievable based on game theoretic considerations. We then propose to use Nash bargaining solution as a tool that provides preferred points on the boundary of the game theoretic rate region. We provide analysis for the 2×2 intereference channel using the FDM achievable rate region. We also outline how to generalize our results to other achievable rate regions for the interference channel as well as the multiple access channel.

AB - In this paper we analyze the interference channel as a conflict situation. This viewpoint implies that certain points in the rate region are unreasonable to one of the players. Therefore these points cannot be considered achievable based on game theoretic considerations. We then propose to use Nash bargaining solution as a tool that provides preferred points on the boundary of the game theoretic rate region. We provide analysis for the 2×2 intereference channel using the FDM achievable rate region. We also outline how to generalize our results to other achievable rate regions for the interference channel as well as the multiple access channel.

KW - Distributed coordination

KW - Game theory

KW - Interference channel

KW - Multiple access channel

KW - Spectrum optimization

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BT - Proceedings - 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006

T2 - 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2006

Y2 - 9 July 2006 through 14 July 2006

ER -

Bargaining over the interference channel

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