Beating the best Nash without regret.

Katrina Ligett, Georgios Piliouras

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, despite its prominent role, has been the subject of much criticism for being too optimistic. Indeed, in general games, natural play need not converge to Nash equilibria. In games with multiple equilibria, it is unclear how players are expected to coordinate; even in games with a unique equilibrium, finding it may involve unreasonable expectations on player communication or computation.
Original languageEnglish
Article number1
Pages (from-to)23-26
Number of pages4
JournalACM SIGecom Exchanges
Volume10
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011

Keywords

  • Economics

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