Abstract
It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria (NE), many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-biased voters, a model recently proposed to avoid such issues. The model introduces an incentive for voters to be truthful when their vote is not pivotal. This is a powerful refinement, and recent simulations reveal that the surviving equilibria tend to have desirable properties. However, truth-bias has been studied only within the context of plurality elections, which is an extreme example of k-approval rules with k = 1. We undertake an equilibrium analysis of the complete range of k-approval rules (except veto).
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |
| Editors | Rafael H. Bordini, Pinar Yolum, Edith Elkind, Gerhard Weiss |
| Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
| Pages | 1733-1734 |
| Number of pages | 2 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450337717 |
| State | Published - 2015 |
| Event | 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: 4 May 2015 → 8 May 2015 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
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| Volume | 3 |
| ISSN (Print) | 1548-8403 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1558-2914 |
Conference
| Conference | 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 |
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| Country/Territory | Turkey |
| City | Istanbul |
| Period | 4/05/15 → 8/05/15 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Nash equilibrium
- Plurality
- Social choice
- Truth bias
- Veto