Blaming the victim: Optimal incentives for private precautions against crime

Omri Ben-Shahar, Alon Harel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

45 Scopus citations
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)434-455
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Issue number2
StatePublished - Oct 1995

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful to Jennifer Arlen, Lucian Bebchuk, Alan Schwartz, Oliver Hart, Louis Kaplow, Steve Tadelis, and Shmuel Zamir for many valuable comments. We also benefited from comments by workshop participants at Harvard University, Hebrew University, and USC Law Center. Financial assistance from the Olin Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

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