Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Abraham Neyman

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(85)90026-6

Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Abraham Neyman^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Einstein Institute of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

227 Scopus citations

Abstract

Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is justified, without departure from strict utility maximization or complete information, but under the assumption that there are bounds (possibly very large) to the complexity of the strategies that the players may use.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	227-229
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	19
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90026-6
State	Published - 1985

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Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Abstract

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