Bounding the cost of stability in games over interaction networks

Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the stability of cooperative games played over an interaction network, in a model that was introduced by Myerson (1977). We show that the cost of stability of such games (i.e., the subsidy required to stabilize the game) can be bounded in terms of natural parameters of their underlying interaction networks. Specifically, we prove that if the treewidth of the interaction network H is k, then the relative cost of stability of any game played over H is at most κ + 1, and if the pathwidth of H is κ′, then the relative cost of stability is at most κ ′, We show that these bounds are tight for all κ ≥ 2 and all κ ′ ≥ 1, respectively.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Pages690-696
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 2013
Event27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 - Bellevue, WA, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 201318 Jul 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013

Conference

Conference27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBellevue, WA
Period14/07/1318/07/13

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