Abstract
In this chapter, I focus on one challenge to Schellenberg’s capacitism, which can be straightforwardly captured by the following trilemma: 1.Capacities First: “Employing perceptual capacities [to discriminate and single out particulars] constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 178) 2. “Individuation Condition: A perceptual capacity Cα is individuated by the mind independent particulars α1, α2, α3, … αn that the perceptual capacity functions to single out.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 180) 3. Phenomenal Variability: The same particular successfully discriminated and singled out (or different particulars of the same type) can be experienced in a wide variety of ways.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science |
Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media B.V. |
Pages | 259-261 |
Number of pages | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2024 |
Publication series
Name | Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science |
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Volume | 60 |
ISSN (Print) | 2214-9775 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 2214-9783 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.