Capacitism and Phenomenal Variance

Arnon Cahen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

In this chapter, I focus on one challenge to Schellenberg’s capacitism, which can be straightforwardly captured by the following trilemma: 1.Capacities First: “Employing perceptual capacities [to discriminate and single out particulars] constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 178) 2. “Individuation Condition: A perceptual capacity Cα is individuated by the mind independent particulars α1, α2, α3, … αn that the perceptual capacity functions to single out.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 180) 3. Phenomenal Variability: The same particular successfully discriminated and singled out (or different particulars of the same type) can be experienced in a wide variety of ways.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages259-261
Number of pages3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2024

Publication series

NameLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
Volume60
ISSN (Print)2214-9775
ISSN (Electronic)2214-9783

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.

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